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During the Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic in Liberia, contact tracing was implemented
to rapidly detect new cases and prevent further transmission. We describe the scope and
characteristics of contact tracing in Liberia and assess its performance during the 2014–
2015 EVD epidemic.
Methodology/Principal findings
We performed a retrospective descriptive analysis of data collection forms for contact trac-
ing conducted in six counties during June 2014–July 2015. EVD case counts from situation
reports in the same counties were used to assess contact tracing coverage and sensitivity.
Contacts who presented with symptoms and/or died, and monitoring was stopped, were
classified as “potential cases”. Positive predictive value (PPV) was defined as the proportion
of traced contacts who were identified as potential cases. Bivariate and multivariate logistic
regression models were used to identify characteristics among potential cases.
We analyzed 25,830 contact tracing records for contacts who had monitoring initiated or
were last exposed between June 4, 2014 and July 13, 2015. Contact tracing was initiated for
26.7% of total EVD cases and detected 3.6% of all new cases during this period. Eighty-
eight percent of contacts completed monitoring, and 334 contacts were identified as poten-
tial cases (PPV = 1.4%). Potential cases were more likely to be detected early in the out-
break; hail from rural areas; report multiple exposures and symptoms; have household
contact or direct bodily or fluid contact; and report nausea, fever, or weakness compared to
contacts who completed monitoring.
Conclusions/Significance
Contact tracing was a critical intervention in Liberia and represented one of the largest con-
tact tracing efforts during an epidemic in history. While there were notable improvements in
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implementation over time, these data suggest there were limitations to its performance—
particularly in urban districts and during peak transmission. Recommendations for improving
performance include integrated surveillance, decentralized management of multidisciplinary
teams, comprehensive protocols, and community-led strategies.
Author summary
Contact tracing is comprised of three main steps: identifying, listing, and monitoring per-
sons who have been exposed to infected individuals, with the goal of rapidly diagnosing
and treating new cases and preventing further spread of infection. This approach has been
used to control transmission of infectious diseases including smallpox, tuberculosis, HIV,
and syphilis, and while contact tracing has been used in prior outbreaks of hemorrhagic
fever, these outbreaks were small in scale. During the 2014–2015 Ebola virus disease
(EVD) epidemic in Liberia, contact tracing was implemented in all 15 counties on a scale
that was unprecedented, particularly within both rural and crowded urban settings. This
work provides insight into the magnitude that which contact tracing was implemented, its
characteristics, as well as an assessment on its performance. Given that contract tracing is
a critical tool for controlling disease spread, these findings aid in informing future plan-
ning and decision making for its implementation.
Introduction
In March 2014, Liberia detected its first cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in Lofa, a northern
county bordering Guinea and Sierra Leone [1]. The Liberian Ministry of Health (MOH) (for-
merly Ministry of Health and Social Welfare) established a national task force and initiated
control efforts, including contact tracing [1, 2]. As the epidemic grew, the task force developed
into an Incident Management System, which oversaw contact tracing in all 15 counties with
support from international partners including World Health Organization (WHO), U.S. Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and Action Contre la Faim [3, 4, 5]. Continu-
ous, widespread transmission continued until February 2015 [6], and 42 days after the last
confirmed case had two negative samples in March 2015 [7], Liberia was declared free of Ebola
on May 9, 2015—marking an end to the epidemic [8].
Contact tracing is comprised of three main steps: identifying, listing, and monitoring per-
sons who have been exposed to infected individuals, with the goal of rapidly diagnosing and
treating new cases and preventing further spread of infection. This approach has been used to
control transmission of infectious diseases including smallpox, tuberculosis, HIV, and syphilis
[9, 10, 11, 12]. Although contact tracing has been used in prior outbreaks of hemorrhagic
fever, these outbreaks were small in scale [13, 14]. Contact tracing is most efficient for diseases
with low incidence, limited transmissibility [15, 16], tight networks, and an incubation period
long enough to allow intervention. Conversely, the effectiveness and optimal levels of invest-
ment for contact tracing, particularly for emerging diseases and for acute epidemics, are sub-
jects of ongoing research and debate [15, 16, 17, 18, 19].
The 2014 EVD epidemic was the largest EVD outbreak in history and the first known EVD
outbreak in West Africa [20]. The scale of the control efforts including contact tracing was
unprecedented, particularly within both rural and crowded urban settings, which burdened
existing surveillance capabilities and required immense commitment and cooperation on the
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part of government and the affected communities themselves. Furthermore, the strategies and
implementation of contact tracing in Liberia evolved—from establishing operations to scaling
them up—in order to respond to the changing phases of the epidemic. These aspects warrant
the need to further examine contact tracing within this unique context. Here, we describe the
scope and characteristics of contact tracing in Liberia and explore its performance during the
2014–2015 EVD epidemic in order to inform future contact tracing strategies in large-scale
epidemics.
Methods
Study design and setting
We performed a retrospective descriptive analysis of data collection forms for contact tracing
that was conducted for the EVD epidemic in six of Liberia’s 15 counties during June 2014–July
2015. The six counties consisted of both rural and urban areas and represented 72% of the pop-
ulation of Liberia [21]. Three of the counties (Lofa, Bong, and Nimba) are at the border with
Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, or Sierra Leone, while the other three (Montserrado, Margibi, and
Sinoe) extend from central areas to the coast. Additionally, both formal and informal sources
of information regarding contact tracing organizational structures and implementation within
these counties were reviewed to help provide context for the data analysis.
Contact definition
A contact was defined as a person who had direct or indirect exposure to any confirmed, prob-
able, or suspect EVD case, or bodily fluids of a case, within the past 21 days [22, 23]. This defi-
nition also included any persons who had been discharged from an Ebola Treatment Unit
(ETU) as not a case, due to their potential exposure to the virus while in the ETU.
Contact tracing procedures
National contact tracing guidelines and forms, which were initially adapted from existing
WHO and CDC materials and finalized during the waning days of the epidemic, were used as
the foundation for implementing the three steps of contact tracing: contact identification, list-
ing, and monitoring. Once a case was detected, contact identification and listing were con-
ducted by interviewing the case and/or family members to gather an initial list of potentially
exposed persons. In most instances, this process was conducted by case investigation teams,
which were distinct from contact tracing teams, and any of the following six types of exposure
were added: (1) sleeping or eating in the same household; (2) direct physical contact with the
body; (3) touching bodily fluids; (4) manipulating clothes or other objects; (5) through breast-
feeding; and (6) attending a case’s funeral.
Contact tracers, chosen from within the community, located the listed contacts and identi-
fied any additional contacts missed in the initial investigation. Contact tracers transferred the
information collected by case investigation teams to paper forms, including the contact’s
name, county, district, town, and exposure(s). The name, age, location, and unique case identi-
fier of the case for which contacts were listed, i.e. the “source case”, were also recorded.
During contact monitoring, contact tracers were expected to visit contacts twice daily
(morning and afternoon) for 21 days post-exposure in order to identify and record whether
the contact had EVD symptoms. This was determined initially through self-reports and physi-
cal observation, and eventually temperature readings were added for more objective monitor-
ing. Contacts were monitored for nine symptoms: joint pain, fever (>38˚ Celsius), weakness,
nausea, diarrhea, headache, throat pain, red eyes, and mucosal bleeding.
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Data analysis
Following the outbreak, paper contact tracing forms were requested from all County Health
Teams. Forms were received from six counties and the data were entered into a Microsoft
Access database. Data were analyzed using Microsoft Access and Epi Info. Each form was con-
sidered a unique contact record and unit of analysis, though it was possible for individual con-
tacts to be monitored more than once if re-exposed.
Source cases were identified using unique case identifiers, name, age, county, and district.
To assess the coverage of contact tracing, or the percentage of cases for which contacts were
monitored, we calculated the ratio of source cases in the database to the total number of sus-
pected, probable, and confirmed EVD cases in MOH situation reports for the same counties
using the closest approximate dates [24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. The mean number of contacts per
source case was presented as contact-to-case ratios.
We analyzed records by county and district. Urban or rural classifications were assigned
based on districts; districts that hold the county headquarters or that have settlements with a
population of 5,000 or more persons were classified as urban [21]. Two districts, one each in
Nimba and Montserrado counties, were divided into urban and rural sub-districts. Each of the
six exposure categories and nine symptoms were analyzed, and medians and interquartile
ranges (IQR) were calculated.
We divided the timeframe into four phases based on the observed epidemic trends of cases
within Liberia [5], per epidemiologic week (EW): “Phase 1”: the initial increase of cases, from
June to mid-August 2014 (EW 22–33); “Phase 2”: the peak, from mid-August to mid-Novem-
ber 2014 (EW 34–46); “Phase 3”: a decline in the epidemic, from mid-November 2014 through
February 2015 (EW 47–9); and “Phase 4”: sporadic clusters, from March through July 2015
(EW 10–31). The first date of contact monitoring or last date of exposure was used to catego-
rize records by phase. Medians and IQRs for timeliness, determined by the difference between
the last date of exposure and first date of follow-up, were calculated and stratified by urban-
rural and phases.
Each record was assigned one of seven outcomes of monitoring, either designated on the
form or imputed using supplemental information: (1) “completed” the monitoring period of
21 days post-exposure; (2) “dropped” if the source was determined to be not a case; (3) “lost to
follow-up” if the contact could not be located after three consecutive days; (4) “potential cases”
if the contact presented with symptoms and/or died and monitoring was stopped; (5)
“restarted” if monitoring was reinitiated due to a new exposure; (6) “transferred” if the contact
moved to another jurisdiction; or (7) “unknown” for all remaining contacts with no outcome
information. Contacts who presented with symptoms could be referred for medical evaluation
without meeting EVD case definitions; hence, we use the terminology “potential cases”.
We calculated the positive predictive value (PPV) defined as the proportion of traced con-
tacts—excluding those with dropped and unknown outcomes—who were potential cases. Sensi-
tivity was defined as the ratio of potential cases identified during monitoring to the number of
new cases in situation reports in the same counties [24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. This analysis assumes all
potential cases were infected with EVD, and that all source cases and potential cases in the data-
base were included in the total counts from situation reports. Therefore, to the extent that these
assumptions are overstated, the calculations serve as upper limit estimates. PPVs were stratified
by urban-rural and epidemic phases, whereas sensitivity and coverage were stratified by phases.
We used odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals to examine exposure types, symptom
types, phases, and urban-rural amongst potential cases compared with contacts who com-
pleted monitoring; for ordinal variables, the lowest category was used as a reference group.
Chi-square tests with p-values <0.05 were statistically significant. Two multivariate logistic
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regression models were used: (1) urban-rural, phase, and exposure type covariates, limited to
records with1 exposures, and (2) urban-rural, phase, and symptom type covariates, limited
to records with1 symptoms. Only statistically significant variables in bivariate analysis were
included in the models. Nonparametric tests were used for continuous variables.
Ethical considerations
This assessment is included under Johns Hopkins School of Public Health Institutional Review
Board no. 6296 with DHP as principal investigator. A letter of agreement was signed with the
Liberia MOH concerning the publication of contact tracing analyses. This assessment used ret-
rospective data collected for public health surveillance purposes so informed consent was
deemed unnecessary according to the U.S. Common Rule. We followed the Declaration of




We analyzed 25,830 records for contacts who had monitoring initiated or were last exposed
between June 4, 2014 and July 13, 2015 in the six counties. Of these, 25,651 contacts were listed
for 2,465 source cases; an additional 179 contacts had no source case provided. The overall
contact-to-case ratio was 10:1 (median = 7, range 1–424). The contact-to-case ratio increased
with each subsequent phase and was higher in urban than rural districts. There were 9,241
EVD cases in situation reports in the six counties. The upper limit estimate of coverage, or the
maximum percentage of cases for which contacts were monitored, was 26.7%, and was lowest
during Phase 1. (Table 1)
Spatiotemporality
In the six counties providing data, 89.0% of the records were identified in Montserrado
County, 8.6% in Margibi, 1.6% in Bong, 0.4% in Lofa, 0.4% in Sinoe, and 0.1% in Nimba (Fig
Table 1. Performance indicators overall and by urban-rural and phases, six counties—Liberia, June 2014–July 2015.
Overall Urban Rural Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
Listed contacts with a source case N = 25,651 N = 21,369 N = 4,282 N = 821 N = 15,784 N = 8,348 N = 561
Source cases 2,465 1,874 647 144 1,703 587 30
Contact-case ratio 10:1 11:1 7:1 6:1 9:1 14:1 19:1
Total EVD cases N = 9,241 N/A N/A N = 796 N = 6,397 N = 8,291 N = 9,241
% Coverage 26.7 N/A N/A 18.1 28.9 29.4 26.7
Timeliness N = 25,300 N = 21,178 N = 4,119 N = 791 N = 15,402 N = 8,405 N = 562
Median days (IQR) 1 (0–4) 1 (1–4) 0 (0–2) 1 (0–7) 1 (0–3) 1 (1–4) 1 (1–3)
Lost contacts N = 25,569 N = 21,271 N = 4,295 N = 794 N = 15,701 N = 8,387 N = 562
No. (%) 136 (0.5) 112 (0.5) 24 (0.6) 9 (1.1) 102 (0.7) 25 (0.3) 0 (0.0)
PPV† N = 23,801 N = 19,679 N = 4,119 N = 767 N = 15,638 N = 7,012 N = 261
No. (%) 334 (1.4) 212 (1.1) 119 (3.0) 36 (4.7) 252 (1.6) 37 (0.5) 0 (0.0)
New EVD cases N = 9,241 N/A N/A N = 796 N = 5,601 N = 1,892 N = 943
% Sensitivity 3.6 N/A N/A 4.5 4.5 2.0 0.0
Excludes contacts with an unknown outcome.
†Excludes contacts that were dropped or with an unknown outcome.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006762.t001
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1) (Table 2). Records pertained to 22 of Liberia’s 136 districts (Table 2); data from the remain-
ing districts was unavailable due to no contact tracing records or no reported EVD cases. In
total, 21,500 (83.2%) contacts were in seven urban districts/sub-districts, mainly in the Monro-
via capital district in Montserrado, while 4,327 (16.8%) contacts were in 17 rural districts/sub-
districts. Potential cases were less likely to be from urban districts (Table 3).
Temporal trends for contact tracing aligned with disease transmission trends (Fig 2). For
25,690 records grouped by phase, 61.7% were monitored during Phase 2 and 32.9% during
Phase 3. Only contacts in Montserrado were monitored during Phase 4. No contacts were
monitored during May–June 2015, corresponding to the Ebola-free period. Based on 25,300
records, contact tracing was timelier in rural districts; overall, the median difference was 1 day
(IQR 0–4) (Table 1).
Exposures
Of 25,830 total contacts, 17,876 (69.2%) contacts reported 34,284 exposure types, and 7,954
(30.8%) had zero exposures recorded. Among the 17,876 contacts reporting any exposure,
direct physical contact with the body was the most common (73.1%), while funeral attendance
(2.1%) and breastfeeding (0.2%) were the least common (Table 3). Two or more exposure
types were reported in 54.9% of 17,876 contacts; the median was 2 (IQR 1–3). Multivariate
analysis showed the odds of sleeping or eating in the same household, direct physical contact,
or touching bodily fluids were higher amongst potential cases than contacts completing moni-
toring (Table 3).
Fig 1. Geographical distribution of monitored contacts by county (choropleth) and by district (dot density)—
Liberia, June 2014–July 2015. Map created using Epi Info. 1 dot = 10 contacts.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006762.g001
Table 2. Contact tracing records by county—Liberia, June 2014–July 2015.
County County population Contact tracing records Listed districts
n/N (%) n/N (%)
Montserrado 1,118,241 22,980/25,830 (89.0) 5/5 (100.0)
Margibi 209,923 2,208/25,830 (8.6) 4/4 (100.0)
Bong 333,481 404/25,830 (1.6) 7/12 (58.3)
Lofa 276,863 111/25,830 (0.4) 3/7 (42.9)
Sinoe 102,391 99/25,830 (0.4) 2/17 (11.8)
Nimba 462,026 28/25,830 (0.1) 1/17 (5.9)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006762.t002
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Outcome
Of 25,569 contacts with an assigned outcome, 22,680 (87.8%) completed monitoring, 1,768
(6.8%) were dropped, 637 (2.5%) restarted, 334 (1.3%) were potential cases, 136 (0.5%) were
lost to follow-up, and 14 (0.1%) were transferred. Most contacts completed monitoring during
each phase except during Phase 4, when 53.6% of contacts were dropped (Fig 2). More contacts
restarted during phases 2 and 3 than other phases. Potential cases were less likely to be moni-
tored during phases 2 or 3 compared to Phase 1 (Table 3). Twenty-two contacts were not
located prior to monitoring. Of 46 recorded contact deaths, 56.5% were in urban districts and
33 occurred during monitoring (15 after taken to an ETU).
The PPV was 1.4% overall, and was higher in rural (3.0%) than urban (1.1%) districts and
highest during Phase 1 (4.7%), after which it decreased for subsequent phases. The sensitivity
of monitoring, or the maximum proportion of new cases detected, was 3.6%, and was highest
during phases 1 and 2. (Table 1)
Symptoms
Table 4 shows the distribution of reported symptoms. Overall, 326 contacts reported 1,299
symptom types and 3,732 symptom-days; the median symptom types per contact was 4 (IQR
Table 3. Characteristics among contacts completing monitoring versus potential cases, six counties—Liberia, June 2014–July 2015.
All outcomes Completed Potential cases Potential cases vs. Completed Potential cases vs. Completed
n/N (%) n/N (%) n/N (%) OR (95% CI) aOR (95% CI)‡
Urban-Rural
Urban 21,500/25,827 (83.2) 18,777/22,680 (82.8) 212/331 (64.1) 0.37 (0.30–0.47)† 0.52 (0.38–0.70)†
Epidemic phase
Phase 1 823/25,690 (3.2) 706/22,568 (3.1) 36/325 (11.1) Ref Ref
Phase 2 15,859/25,690 (61.7) 14,861/15,567 (95.5) 252/288 (87.5) 0.33 (0.23–0.48)† 0.19 (0.12–0.28)†
Phase 3 8,446/25,690 (32.9) 6,740/7,446 (90.5) 37/73 (50.7) 0.11 (0.07–0.17)† 0.07 (0.04–0.12)†
Phase 4 562/25,690 (2.2) 261/967 (27.0) 0/36 (0.0) 0.00 (0.00–1)
Exposure types per contact
Slept or ate in same household 8,654/17,876 (48.4) 7,827/16,277 (48.1) 146/211 (69.2) 2.42 (1.81–3.25)† 2.16 (1.59–2.94)†
Direct physical contact with body 13,064/17,876 (73.1) 11,884/16,277 (73.0) 173/211 (82.0) 1.68 (1.18–2.40)† 1.76 (1.21–2.54)†
Touched bodily fluids 5,454/17,876 (30.5) 4,975/16,277 (30.6) 95/211 (45.0) 1.86 (1.42–2.45)† 1.52 (1.13–2.05)†
Manipulated clothes or objects 6,701/17,876 (37.5) 6,052/16,277 (37.2) 103/211 (48.8) 1.61 (1.23–2.12)† 1.33 (0.99–1.80)
Breastfed a child 30/17,876 (0.2) 28/16,277 (0.2) 0/211 (0.0) 0.00 (0.00–1)
Attended funeral 381/17,876 (2.1) 379/16,277 (2.3) 1/211 (0.5) 0.00 (0.00–1)
No. exposure types per contact
Single exposure 8,065/17,876 (45.1) 7,387/16,277 (45.4) 52/211 (24.6) Ref
Two exposures 5,340/17,876 (29.9) 4,850/12,237 (39.6) 56/108 (51.9) 1.64 (1.12–2.40)†
Three exposures 2,365/17,876 (13.2) 2,119/9,506 (22.3) 58/110 (52.7) 3.89 (2.67–5.67)†
Four exposures 2,088/17,876 (11.7) 1,906/9,293 (20.5) 45/97 (46.4) 3.35 (2.24–5.02)†
Five exposures 16/17,876 (0.1) 13/7,400 (0.2) 0/52 (0.0) 0.00 (0.00–1)
Six exposures 2/17,876 (0.0) 2/7,389 (0.0) 0/52 (0.0) 0.00 (0.00–1)
Denominator is limited to contacts reporting1 exposure types.
†Statistical significance (p<0.05).
‡Multivariate analysis adjusting for urban-rural, phase, and exposure type covariates; only variables that were statistically significant in bivariate analysis, and
denominator is limited to contacts reporting1 exposure types (N = 16,470).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006762.t003
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2–5). Contacts of all outcomes reported symptoms except transferred contacts; 218 (66.9%) of
326 contacts reporting symptoms were potential cases, 92 (28.2%) completed monitoring, 6
(1.8%) restarted, 6 (1.8%) were unknown, 3 (0.9%) were dropped, and 1 (0.3%) was lost to fol-
low-up. In multivariate analysis, potential cases were more likely to report fever, nausea, or
weakness compared with contacts who completed monitoring.
Fig 2. Contacts in six counties and EVD cases†, by epidemiologic week—Liberia, June 2014–July 2015 By
outcome group (N = 25,296); excludes contacts that were transferred, lost to follow-up, or with an unknown
outcome. †National confirmed and probable EVD cases reported in situation reports (N = 6,035) [34].
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006762.g002
Table 4. Symptoms among contacts completing monitoring versus potential cases, six counties—Liberia, June 2014–July 2015.
All outcomes Completed Potential cases Potential cases vs. Completed Potential cases vs. Completed
n/N (%) n/N (%) n/N (%) OR (95% CI) aOR (95% CI)
Symptom types per contact
Joint pain 185/326 (56.8) 37/92 (40.2) 140/218 (64.2) 2.67 (1.62–4.40)† 1.26 (0.67–2.36)
Fever 254/326 (77.9) 56/92 (60.9) 187/218 (85.8) 3.88 (2.20–6.83)† 2.24 (1.12–4.49)†
Weakness 237/326 (72.7) 45/92 (48.9) 182/218 (83.5) 5.28 (3.07–9.09)† 2.65 (1.38–5.11)†
Nausea 139/326 (42.6) 14/92 (15.2) 119/218 (54.6) 6.70 (3.57–12.55)† 4.34 (1.99–9.48)†
Diarrhea 112/326 (34.4) 15/92 (16.3) 93/218 (42.7) 3.82 (2.07–7.06)† 1.05 (0.47–2.32)
Headache 214/326 (65.6) 57/92 (62.0) 147/218 (67.4) 1.27 (0.77–2.11)
Throat pain 68/326 (20.9) 14/92 (15.2) 50/218 (22.9) 1.66 (0.87–3.18)
Red eyes 68/326 (20.9) 12/92 (13.0) 53/218 (24.3) 2.14 (1.08–4.23)† 0.94 (0.41–2.11)
Bleeding 22/326 (6.8) 7/92 (7.6) 15/218 (6.9) 0.90 (0.35–2.28)
No. symptom types per contact
Single symptom 57/326 (17.5) 36/92 (39.1) 16/218 (7.3) Ref
Two symptoms 41/326 (12.6) 15/51 (29.4) 24/40 (60.0) 3.60 (1.50–8.62)†
Three symptoms 46/326 (14.1) 12/48 (25.0) 32/48 (66.7) 6.00 (2.47–14.57)†
Four to nine symptoms 182/326 (55.8) 29/65 (44.6) 146/162 (90.1) 11.33 (5.56–23.06)†
Denominator is limited to contacts reporting1 symptom types.
†Statistical significance (p<0.05).
‡Multivariate analysis adjusting for urban-rural, phase, and symptom type covariates; only variables that were statistically significant in bivariate analysis were included,
and denominator is limited to contacts reporting 1 symptom types (N = 308).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0006762.t004
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Discussion
During 2014–2015, more than 25,000 persons in six of Liberia’s 15 counties were identified,
listed, and monitored for EVD, representing one of the largest contact tracing efforts during
an epidemic in history. Nationwide, these efforts were even more substantial and required the
dedication of responders, including the Government of Liberia, counties, and contact tracing
teams. As a result, 334 contacts were identified as potential cases with the intention of provid-
ing earlier treatment and preventing hundreds of new infections.
Relative to the scale of these efforts, however, these data suggest there were limitations to
the performance of contact tracing within Liberia. Overall, there was a small proportion of
monitored contacts that were identified as potential cases, and more than 97% of reported
EVD cases from the six counties were not detected through contact monitoring. This is greater
than expected, especially compared to other examples in West Africa where approximately
69% to 78% of cases were not being traced prior to case identification [29, 30]. This measure is
dependent upon the level of contact tracing coverage, and based on our database, though
admittedly not comprehensive, coverage only accounted for a maximum of one-quarter of all
EVD cases reported for these six counties. While this ratio is aligned with similar findings in
two Guinea prefectures (32% and 39%) and in Sierra Leone (19%) [29, 30], it is possible that
contact tracing was not initiated for up to three-quarters of the remaining EVD cases in Libe-
ria, potentially due to a combination of factors discussed below.
Potential cases were more likely to be identified in rural districts and early in the epidemic,
despite intensified efforts as the epidemic progressed. Possible explanations for why contact
tracing was less effective in urban areas could include the following: higher population density
and complex social networks making it more difficult to identify all contacts; less cooperation
within urban settings; higher burden and strained resources; or a combination of these factors.
These results support the concept that contact tracing is most successful when transmission is
low, and models have shown that expanding implementation of contact tracing yields dimin-
ishing reductions in disease prevalence [15, 16]. Therefore, it is critical to conduct contact trac-
ing rigorously and comprehensively as soon as an outbreak is identified, and to achieve higher
sensitivity and coverage during this phase.
There were, however, notable improvements in implementation over time; specifically,
greater coverage, fewer contacts lost to follow-up, and higher contact-to-case ratios. During
Phase 4, Liberia was able to focus more resources on eliminating the last transmission chains,
including expanding the inclusion criteria to ensure no new cases went undetected [6]. This
would have resulted in a larger contact-to-case ratio during Phase 4 compared to all other
phases.
The dynamics of contact tracing are complex, and its success is related to characteristics of
the disease and etiologic agent, resources, and socio-political factors that influence its accept-
ability and implementation. Additionally, the approaches to contact tracing may differ
depending on whether there is a vaccine or therapy available. Given that contact tracing
remains one of the critical public health tools during outbreaks involving person-person trans-
mission, optimizing its performance is paramount. While not exhaustive, we focus on four key
challenges that may have limited the performance of contact tracing for EVD within Liberia,
and propose recommendations for future efforts.
First, an integrated surveillance and data management system was lacking and had to be
established for reporting between the national laboratory, healthcare facilities and ETUs, and
contact tracing and case investigation field teams [5]. Consequently, contact tracing was less
functional at the beginning of the epidemic when it could have been most effective in slowing
the epidemic. Initially, an insufficiently integrated system resulted in missed source cases and
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contacts, and led to delays in monitoring; this is reflected in that 25% of contacts with available
information started monitoring four days after their last exposure. Additionally, contacts were
listed and needlessly traced because of delays in receiving negative laboratory results, thereby
lowering the PPV. Although mobile applications had the potential to improve reporting and
data management, these were not piloted until after the peak of the outbreak. In contrast, con-
tact tracing in urban Nigeria successfully and rapidly contained EVD transmission, largely
thanks to robust surveillance systems and leveraging mobile applications for real-time moni-
toring [31, 32]. Strengthening integrated surveillance and electronic data systems, and the
early adoption of mobile technology, could help improve timely reporting for listing and mon-
itoring contacts.
Secondly, the organizational structure for contact tracing likely led to inefficiencies in its
implementation and management, particularly in urban districts. For instance, case investiga-
tion teams, who conducted contact listing, were often distinct from contact tracing teams who
conducted contact monitoring. In some rural areas, teams responded in tandem thereby
reducing gaps, yet this was more difficult in dense urban areas such as in Montserrado County.
Additionally, the county level coordinated all aspects of the response—not just contact tracing.
In January 2015, Montserrado created decentralized sub-county sectors to oversee and syn-
chronize all operations—a change previously recognized as a critical step for halting transmis-
sion [6]. Particularly in urban areas and in the absence of a robust surveillance system, using a
decentralized management approach and multidisciplinary teams may improve contact trac-
ing performance.
Thirdly, there were challenges with adapting and implementing contact tracing protocols,
which had to be used by novice teams during the epidemic. For instance, the number of con-
tacts per source case ranged widely in our analysis, from 1 to 424, and nearly one-third of con-
tacts had no exposure documented, indicating that some contacts may not have met the
inclusion criteria, thereby straining resources. Also, written guidance for identifying potential
cases during monitoring did not specify how contact tracers should determine when to refer a
contact for medical evaluation [23]. Eighteen contacts, who presumably would have shown
symptoms prior to death, died during monitoring without being referred for medical evalua-
tion. Among contacts who reported symptoms, including multiple symptoms and symptom-
days, 33.1% continued under monitoring without being referred for further evaluation, indi-
cating that triggers for identifying potential cases was subjective. During future outbreaks,
clear and comprehensive protocols need to be initiated early in the epidemic and reinforced
throughout implementation. Furthermore, if resources are limited, inclusion criteria could
prioritize contacts with multiple exposures, and/or those with household contact or direct con-
tact with the body or bodily fluids. Triggers for identifying potential cases could include con-
tacts reporting multiple symptoms types, fever, nausea, and weakness.
Finally, community perceptions, stigma, and mistrust reportedly led to challenges in
obtaining complete and reliable information, to delays or an inability to trace contacts due to
evasion, and even to violence [5, 33]. Underreporting of symptoms due to fear or due to fever-
reducing drugs may explain why relatively few symptoms were captured in our database. Also,
contacts were instructed to self-isolate within their home, which disrupted normal routines
and the ability to maintain jobs; without adequate support from the community or organiza-
tions, contacts are less likely to cooperate. These aspects stress the importance of community
cooperation, trust, and engagement. Overall, less than 1% of contacts were lost to follow-up,
and this improved during each phase along with more contacts listed per source case, suggest-
ing that this cooperation probably improved as the outbreak progressed. For future outbreaks,
community-led strategies for contact tracing should be an early priority to foster cooperation,
trust, and ownership of the control efforts.
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This analysis represented both urban and rural settings, and Montserrado specifically,
where the response was most intense. However, we were unable to collect forms from all 15
counties nor all forms from the six inclusive counties; for example, no forms were available for
the EVD cluster that occurred in Margibi in July 2015. Despite commendable efforts, counties
reported that paper forms were lost or destroyed due to perceived contamination risks. Using
paper forms also led to variability in data quality, including illegible writing, misspellings,
inversed source case and contact information, and difficulty in interpreting marks for visits
and the presence of symptoms. Falsifying information on forms was a concern [33], such as
documenting visits when the contact had not been seen, and this was an issue early in the
epidemic.
These factors, combined with the lack of information to ascertain the final status of EVD
infection amongst source cases and potential cases, constrained our analysis. Likewise, we
could not conclude whether symptoms reported amongst potential cases evidenced EVD
infection. Our data primarily represented contact monitoring, as we did not have a compre-
hensive contact listing. Finally, EVD case counts from situation reports were unavailable to
stratify coverage and sensitivity by urban-rural districts and/or phase, and these aggregated
totals could not be linked to our individual-level database.
Our findings suggest that despite the unprecedented scale of contact tracing for EVD in
Liberia, there were limitations in its ability to detect new cases, especially in urban areas and
during the peak case load. Since contact tracing remains a critical intervention for controlling
outbreaks, we suggest rigorous implementation early in the outbreak and focusing on four key
areas to optimize its performance within similar contexts: (1) strengthening integrated surveil-
lance and electronic data systems, (2) decentralizing management of multidisciplinary teams
for improved coordination and oversight, (3) instituting and reinforcing clear and comprehen-
sive protocols, and (4) adapting community-led strategies to foster cooperation, trust, and
ownership.
Supporting information
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